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Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?
Charles N. Brower* and Stephan W. Schil**
I. THE "LEGITIMACY CRISIS" IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
International courts and tribunals are, in contrast to their domestic
counterparts, in the unique situation of having to defend themselves on a regular
basis against attacks on their legitimacy as mechanisms for resolving disputes
about the scope and the limits of state sovereignty. By "legitimacy" we mean
acceptance of "a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that
the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with
generally accepted principles of right process."1 Such legitimacy concerns affect
not only dispute-settlement institutions as a whole, but also inform the self-
understanding and the work of those who decide disputes on the international
level-in other words, international judges and arbitrators. This holds true for
any of the many international dispute-settlement bodies that have come into
existence over the past two decades or so. 2 It holds particularly true in what
Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague; Judge Ad Hoc, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica; Arbitrator Member, 20 Essex Street Chambers, London;
formerly Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department of State; Deputy Special Counsellor to
the President of the United States; President, American Society of International Law; and
Chairman, Institute for Transnational Arbitration.
** International Arbitration Law Clerk to The Honorable Charles N. Brower, 20 Essex Street
Chambers, London; Rechtsanwalt (admitted to the bar in Germany); Attorney-at-Law (New
York); Dr iur CJohann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitit, Frankfurt am Main, 2008); LLM
International Legal Studies (NYU, 2006); LLM Europiisches und Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht
(Universitdt Augsburg, 2002).
I For this definition of legitimacy, see Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legiimay among Nations 24
(Oxford 1990).
2 On the proliferation of international dispute-settlement bodies and their impact on the
international legal system, see generally Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the Proliferation of
International De pute Resoluion Tribunals Leave International Law?, 96 Am Socy Ind L Proc 219 (2002);
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appears to be the fastest growing area of international law at this time:
international investment law. Without a compte rendu of their function and impact
on society, those deciding investment disputes not only will have difficulty
responding to legitimacy-related criticisms-they also will have trouble
understanding their own position and the responsibility it entails.
Defenses of the legitimacy of international investment law and investment
dispute resolution have not, however, kept pace with the enormous
development of this field of international law and the accompanying critical
attention it has received. Indeed, investment treaties have proliferated to an
unprecedented degree, having surged from less than 400 in 1989 to well over
2,500 bilateral, regional, and sectoral treaties today.3 Equally, the volume of
investor-state arbitrations under these treaties has risen just within the last
decade to well over two hundred, with new arbitrations being initiated on an
almost daily basis.4 This rise of international investment law and its dispute-
settlement mechanisms does not, however, take place in a void. It is a
consequence of equally unprecedented increases in transborder investment
flows, a necessary concomitant of the increasing globalization that has taken
place since the end of the Cold War.' It is this change in the world's social and
economic environment that has created the need for legal institutions that
Shane Spelliscy, Note, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor, 40 Colum J
Transnad L 143 (2001); Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals:
InternationalAdjudication in Ascendance, 94 Am Socy Ind L Proc 160 (2000); Jonathan I. Charney,
The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 NYU J
Intl L & Pol 697 (1999); Benedict Kingsbury, Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a
Systemic Problem?, 31 NYU J Intl L & Pol 679 (1999); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferaion of
InternationalJudicial Bodies: The Piece of the Puz!Zle, 31 NYU J Intl L & Pol 709 (1999); Laurence R.
Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 Yale L J
273 (1997). For the remaining contributions to a symposium held at New York University School
of Law in October 1998 on the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, see also 31
NYUJ Intl L & Pol 679-933 (1999).
On the statistical increase of investment treaties, see UN Conference on Trade and Development,
Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s 9 (UN 1998). See also UN Conference on Trade and
Development, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2006-June 2007) 2 (2007),
available online at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20076_en.pdf> (visited Dec 5,
2008) (recording an aggregate of 2,573 bilateral investment treaties at the end of 2006).
4 UN Conference on Trade and Development, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dipute Settlement,
1-2 (2008), available online at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20083_en.pdf> (visited
Dec 5, 2008) (recording an aggregate of 290 investment based disputes).
On the development of foreign investment flows, see UN Conference on Trade and
Development, World Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and
Development 3-30 (2007), available online at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2007_en.pdf>
(visited Dec 5, 2008) (highlighting increasing corporate profits worldwide and increased
investment in developing countries, particularly those countries rich in natural resources).
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structure and stabilize foreign investment activities and help to regulate conflicts
that unavoidably arise out of increases in investment cooperation.
Equally unavoidably, the rise of investment treaties and investment-treaty
arbitration has attracted critical attention from the users of the dispute-
settlement mechanism (that is, investors and host states) as well as various
interest groups that claim to represent "civil society" and the "public interest."
Although these critical voices vary in the specific points they raise and in the
tone in which they raise them, they have contributed to a considerable amount
of literature intimating that investment law may be in a veritable "legitimacy
crisis. 6  On the one hand, this crisis is caused by the vagueness and
indeterminacy of the standard investor rights, leading to problematic
predictability in the application of investment treaties On the other hand, it
originates from procedural aspects of investment treaty arbitration, specifically
problems relating to the overlap between different arbitral institutions and
control mechanisms8 and the resulting inconsistencies in the decisions of
different arbitral tribunals. 9
While some of these problems, in particular unpredictability and incoherence
in investor-state dispute settlement, are considerable and in need of serious
attention, arguably a solution will come with the passage of time. Increasing
dispute-settlement procedures and doctrinal efforts promise to prove that
concepts relating to investors' rights, such as fair and equitable treatment and
indirect expropriation, are not as vague and indeterminate as some argue. They
increasingly will provide yardsticks for the judicial settlement of disputes that
have proven to be workable not only in several international fora-such as the
Iran-US Claims Tribunal" or the various claims commissions established at the
6 See M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionagy Trends in Investment Treaoy Arbitration, in Karl P.
Sauvant, ed, Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 39-45 (Oxford 2008); Ari Afilalo,
Meaning Ambiguify and Legitimay: Judicial (Re-)construction of NAFTA Chapter 11, 25 Nw J Intl L &
Bus 279, 282 (2005); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimagy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatiing
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L Rev 1521, 1523 (2005); Ari
Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve
Their Legiimay Crisis, 17 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 51 (2004); Charles H. Brower II, Structure,
Legilima, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 Vand J Transnatl L 37 (2003); Charles N. Brower,
Charles H. Brower II, and Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the GlobalAdjudication System, 19
Arb Intl 415 (2003); Charles N. Brower, A Crisis ofLegitimay, Nad LJ B9 (Oct 7, 2002).
7 See Brower II, 36 Vand J Transnad L at 52 (cited in note 6).
8 Brower, Brower II, and Sharpe, 19 Arb Intl at 419 (cited in note 6).
9 Franck, 73 Fordham L Rev at 1545-47 (cited in note 6) (explaining the different scenarios under
which inconsistencies most commonly occur).
10 On the concept of indirect expropriation as applied by the Tribunal, see Charles N. Brower and
Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 394-410 (Kluwer 1998); George H.
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beginning of the twentieth century to solve investment-related disputes"-but
also in domestic courts that entertain disputes concerning the relationship
between property protection and competing private and public interests.12 Thus,
the passage of time-bringing with it a continuous stream of investment
jurisprudence, a refinement of state practice and treaty making, and growing
doctrinal analysis-may help create a better understanding of the content and
scope of the central principles of investment protection and result in the
creation of a jurioprudence constante.
There is, however, another arguably more serious critique that questions the
legitimacy of international investment law and arbitration beyond the problems
of predictability and consistency. It comes in two forms: first, a hegemonic
critique of international investment law that originates from a Marxist analysis of
international law and views international investment law as an attempt by
developed countries to impose their power on weaker, developing countries;13
and second, a more nuanced critique of the perceived unevenness created by a
regime that protects property, investment, and foreign investors without
sufficient regard to other non-investment-related interests of host states. 14 Both
strands consistently turn, however, around a common core: the criticism that
investment treaties unilaterally favor the interests of investors over the host
state's competing interests, thus establishing an asymmetric legal regime that is
detrimental to state sovereignty. In other words, the criticism asserts that
Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 174-88 (Oxford 1996) (outlining
the doctrines that justify the Tribunal's takings rulings).
11 See A.H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions: 1923-1934: A Study in the Law and Procedure of
International Tribunals (Macmillan 1935) (describing Mexico's history with transnational claims
commissions and its efforts to resolve conflicts between these commissions).
12 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Propery and the Power of Eminent Domain 96-97 (Harvard
1985) (explaining how common law rules can evolve and allow for government intervention
without drastic undermining of property interests).
13 See, for example, B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making,
15 Eur J Ind L 1, 7 (2004) (arguing that the subjection of national law to international standards is
an attempt to remove local barriers to capital accumulation); B.S. Chimni, Marxism and International
Law, Econ & Pol Wkly 337 (Feb 6,1999).
14 See, for example, Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect
on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 Va J Intl L 953, 956-57 (2007) (arguing that existing
bilateral investment treaties strongly favor investors and that these inequalities will eventually lead
to greater difficulties in enforcement of such treaties); Gus Van Harten, Investment Treay Arbitration
and Public Law (Oxford 2007); Vicki L. Been and Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fih Amendment?
NAFTA's Investment Protections and the MisguidedQuest for an International 'Rtgulatoy Takings" Doctrine,
78 NYU L Rev 30, 35-37 (2003) (criticizing international tribunals for adopting US regulatory
takings standards too aggressively given the legal climate of the rest of the world, taking that
precedent even further than it has been applied within US courts). See also Naveen Gurudevan,
An Evaluation of Current Legitimagy-Based Objections to NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Dispute
Resolution Process, 6 San Diego Ind L J 399, 402 (2005).
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investment treaties and investment-treaty arbitration institutionalize a pro-
investor bias that casts the legitimacy of the entire system of international
investment law and arbitration into doubt.
These critics make three arguments about the supposedly asymmetric nature
of the substance and procedures of investment treaties and investment-treaty
arbitration. First, they claim that, as regards substantive obligations, investment
treaties do not match investors' rights with investors' obligations and therefore
pose a threat to the authority of the state in advancing public interests that
compete with the protection of property and investment. Second, critics argue
that investment treaties exacerbate this pro-investor bias procedurally by
providing investors with a right to initiate investment-treaty arbitration, but
denying such a right to the host state. Finally, critics question the legitimacy of
the dispute-settlement mechanism provided for under investment treaties, taking
issue with the ad hoc appointment of arbitrators for specific disputes by the
disputing parties, in contrast to other international dispute-resolution
mechanisms that feature more permanent adjudicators appointed through more
neutral processes.
These perceived shortcomings have led to calls for replacement or radical
redesign of investor-state dispute-settlement mechanisms. Suggested alternatives
range from a return to state-to-state arbitration to the less-radical call for the
establishment of a permanent international investment court with tenured
judges. The necessity of such changes is said to gain urgency from the fact that
recently certain states have withdrawn from bilateral investment treaties,"5 have
either denounced or announced their intention to denounce the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States ("ICSID Convention"),16 or have re-crafted the substance of their
investment-treaty practice in a way that reflects concerns about the growth and
the jurisprudential trends of the system of investment arbitration.17 Notably,
15 On April 30, 2008, Venezuela communicated to the Netherlands its intention to terminate the
Dutch-Venezuelan Bilateral Investment Treaty as of November 1, 2008. Luke Eric Peterson, ed,
Investment Arbitration Reporter 2 (May 16, 2008), available online at <http://www.iareporter.
com/Archive/IAR-05-16-08.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) (reporting that Venezuela had chosen to
end the treaty citing reasons of "national policy").
16 As of November 3, 2007, Bolivia has withdrawn from the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention"). See
Bolivia Denounces ICSID Convention, 46 ILM 973 (2007). Rhetoric about withdrawal from the ICSID
Convention has also been heard in respect to Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. See Marco E.
Schnabl and Julie Bdard, The Wrong Kind of Tnteresting,'NatI L J § 1 (July 30, 2007).
17 See Gilbert Gagn6 and Jean-Fr~dric Morin, The Evolving American Poligy on Investment Proteclion:
Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 J Intl Econ L 357, 363 (2006); Stephen
Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treay: An Exerse in the Regressive
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such developments are present in capital-importing as well as capital-exporting
countries that themselves have been defending against investment arbitrations. 8
Until now, this critical literature on investment treaties and investment-treaty
arbitration has not been matched by an equally forceful defense of the system
that explains its advantages over proposed alternatives and justifies the
institutional and structural choices that states made when setting up the current
system. To begin to fill this void, this Article responds to these criticisms and
attempts to put forward a critique of the critique of international investment law.
We argue that investment treaties and investment-treaty arbitration do not
unilaterally favor investors' interests over competing public policy choices and
do not institutionalize a pro-investor bias. To the contrary, investment law is
much more nuanced and balanced, both with regard to its substance and its
procedural implementation. Much more than buttressing singular capital
interests, investment treaties and arbitration aim at anchoring good governance
standards that lock states into a policymaking framework that is open towards
the functioning of markets in a global economic system, without losing sight of
the state's legitimate regulatory interests.
For this purpose, the present Article addresses three distinct issues that are
central to the critique of investment treaties and arbitration. First, it discusses the
virtues of granting investors an independent right to initiate dispute settlement
directly against the host state instead of forcing them to rely either on dispute
resolution in domestic courts or on interstate dispute resolution. Second, this
Article shows how investment-treaty arbitration takes into account private and
public interests in deciding whether state conduct has violated the rights granted
to investors under investment treaties. It thus argues that concepts related to
investors' rights, such as fair and equitable treatment or the concept of indirect
expropriation, do not establish rights that unilaterally favor investors over states.
Third, this Article addresses the relatively recent critique of whether arbitration,
as compared to a permanent court with tenured judges, vitiates the legitimacy of
international investment law. It explains the institutional choice in favor of
arbitration, analyzes the independence and impartiality of arbitrators and shows
which control mechanisms preclude the arbitral mechanism from becoming a
source of pro-investor bias. Finally, the Article concludes by pointing to
strategies by which the present system of investment-treaty arbitration can, and
increasingly does, accommodate the legitimate concerns of nonparties to the
Development of International Law, 3 Transnad Disp Mgmt 1, 3-7 (Apr 2006); Mark Kantor, The New
Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy Developments, 21 J Intl Arb 383, 385 (2004).
18 See generally Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbilraion: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 Yale J Intl L 365 (2003) (discussing the phenomenon of
developed countries as respondents in investment treaty arbitration).
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proceedings. Such strategies, it is argued, do not require a radical redesign of the
entire system, but can be integrated into the existing system of international
investment law and arbitration. In sum, this Article argues that investment
treaties and investor-state arbitration constitute a legitimate vehicle for
structuring and stabilizing foreign investment activities.
II. THE VIRTUES OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The right of a foreign investor to initiate arbitration against the host state is
one of the primary targets of criticism of investment treaties. This right is one of
the most striking differences that modern investment treaties offer to alien
investors as compared to customary international law, and has been designated
rightly as a "change in paradigm in international investment law."' 19 Indeed,
without the investor having the option of recourse to arbitration, investment
treaties would be mere political declarations (albeit with some implications on
the diplomatic level) instead of a set of rules enforceable against states. The
importance of this right in fulfilling the object and purpose of investment
treaties to protect and promote foreign investment becomes most apparent in
considering the function that independent dispute-settlement mechanisms
perform in stabilizing and enabling economic exchange in the investment
context.
Dispute settlement has a central function in stabilizing the expectations of
foreign investors and enables them to counter opportunistic behavior by the
host state, such as unreasonable interferences with the investor's economic
rights or even expropriations without compensation. Recourse to a dispute-
settlement and enforcement mechanism empowers the investor to effectively
hold states liable for breaches of their promises in investment treaties to not
expropriate foreign investors without compensation, to treat them fairly and
equitably, to provide full protection and security, and so on. Conversely, from
the host state's perspective, the investor's right to initiate arbitration enables the
host state to make credible the commitments it made under its investment
treaties.20 This, in turn, reduces the political risk of foreign investment, lowers
the risk premium connected to it, and therefore makes investment projects more
cost-efficient. This increased efficiency benefits not only investors, but also the
host state, as the products and services that a foreign investor offers become
cheaper.
19 See generally Christoph Schreuer, Paradigmenwechsel im Internalionalen Investiionsrecht, in Waldemar
Hummer, ed, Paradigmenwechsel im V6lkerrecht zyrJahrtausendwende 237 (Manz 2002).
20 See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L J
541, 556-62 (2003).
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Certainly, the credibility of the host state's commitments does not solely rely
on the availability of dispute-settlement mechanisms. Reputation, community
pressure, the moral obligation to keep promises, or the host state's self-interest
may also contribute to the host state's adherence to its investment treaties.2'
Reproachable conduct against one investor might negatively impact the trust
that other investors have in the political stability of the host state and thus cause
them to refrain from investing there. Equally, political pressure exercised by
other states might further incentivize host states to comply with promises they
have made vis-a-vis foreign investors.22 Yet in the investment context, such
mechanisms only work imperfectly as demonstrated by numerous examples of
large-scale expropriations without adequate compensation, for instance in Cuba,
Iran, and Zimbabwe. 23 This is because in a typical situation the host state can
potentially benefit by unilaterally resiling from its obligation once the investor
has completed his initial investment. 24 In this situation, the host state has an
incentive to change the investment terms unilaterally, impose additional
obligations on the investor, or even expropriate an investor without sufficient
compensation. The investor, in turn, cannot easily reemploy his investment
elsewhere without significant losses in the form of sunk costs. Thus, often the
only possibility for the host state to make credible commitments and immunize
investor-state cooperation against subsequent opportunistic behavior is through
the establishment of independent third-party dispute-settlement mechanisms
such as courts or arbitration.25 Such post hoc control and governance
mechanisms ensure that the bargain initially struck will be upheld and thus
empower the parties to engage in cost-efficient private ordering and to make
credible commitments. Dispute settlement is thus necessary to compensate for
the structural inequalities between foreign investors and host states.
21 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works. A Rational Choice Theory 71-117
(Oxford 2008) (detailing how reputation functions as a mechanism to induce states' compliance
with their obligations under international law).
22 See Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment Protection, 9 Eur Bus Org L
Rev 1, 14 (2008).
23 For a general discussion of large-scale expropriations, see Eric N. Baklanoff, Expropriation of U.S.
Investments in Cuba, Mexico, and Chile (Praeger 1975).
24 The underlying change in the incentive structure after one party has started performing or placed
an asset under the control of the other party is also described as a hold-up problem. See Oliver E.
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting 52-56
(Colier 1985). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Populariy of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 Va j Intl L 639, 658-66 (1998). For a game-theoretic
reconstruction, see Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 184-85 (Pearson 5th ed
2008).
25 See Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons, Competing For Capitak The
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 Intl Org 811, 823-24 (2006).
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However, neither the courts of the host state nor the courts of any third
state are well-positioned to enforce the state's promises vis-A-vis foreign
investors, including those in investment treaties. The problem with most state
courts is that they are not-or at least they are not perceived to be-sufficiently
neutral in resolving disputes between foreign investors and host states. In many
developing and transitioning countries, independent courts that decide cases in
accordance with pre-established rules of law in a timely fashion are missing
altogether. Corruption in the judiciary is a sad but daily business in the courts of
many countries." Additionally, lengthy and inefficient court proceedings
dragging on over years, if not decades, remain too commonplace.27 Under such
circumstances, it is difficult to argue convincingly that dispute resolution in
many host states' courts constitutes a way for investors to make a recalcitrant
host state comply with its investment-treaty commitments.28
Similarly, the courts of third states are not better placed to offer effective
dispute settlement between investors and host states. The judiciary outside the
host state is often equally reluctant to subject sovereign nations to full-fledged
judicial scrutiny and control. Various legal obstacles-including state immunity
and doctrines of judicial restraint such as the act-of-state doctrine-constitute
significant limits to the subjection of host states to third-country jurisdiction.29
Courts outside the host state are, therefore, equally incapable of providing
26 On corruption in the judiciary, see generally Maria Dakolias and Kimberley L. Thachuk, Altacking
Corruption in the Judidagy: A Criical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 Wis Intl L J 353 (2000); Eduardo
Buscaglia and Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Comrption in theJudidagy, 30 L & Poly Inl
Bus 95 (1999).
27 See, for example, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Length of Court Proceedings in
the Member States of the Coundl of Europe Based on the Case-Law of the of the European Court of Human
Rghts 27-42, 45, CEPEJ-TF-DEL (2006) 3 (report by Frangoise Calvez), available online at
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/CEPEJCourtDelay.pdf>
(visited Dec 5, 2008) (reporting that the European Court of Human Rights found reasonable time
violations in 41 cases between 1987 and 2004, and describing some of the reasons for these time
delays).
28 Exceptions to these observations exist, especially in countries with well-developed judicial systems
that provide for effective and independent protection against government conduct. This may also
account for the non-inclusion of an investor-state dispute-settlement mechanism in the recent
Australia-US Free Trade Agreement. See William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement between
Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 Vand J Transnatl
L 1, 2-4 (2006).
29 M. Sornarajah, The Pursuit ofNafionalized Propery 253-301 (Martinus Nijhoff 1986). Specifically on
the situation in the United States, see Ronald Mok, Comment, Expropriation Claims in United States
Courts: The Act of State Doctrine, the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
A Roadmapfor the Expropriated Victim, 8 Pace Intl L Rev 199 (1996). See also Banco National de Cuba
v Sabbaino, 376 US 398, 421 (1964) (on the act-of-state doctrine); Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 208-
13 (1962) (on the political question doctrine). Comparable doctrines also exist in other domestic
legal systems.
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effective enforcement mechanisms that could back up the credibility of promises
a host state makes vis- -vis foreign investors.
The investor's options for the enforcement of host-state promises are not
any better under the framework established by customary international law.
Here, investors are denied standing to initiate proceedings in international courts
and tribunals. Instead, only the home state of an investor is able to espouse its
claim and exercise diplomatic protection.30 Significant drawbacks, however,
vitiate the effectiveness of diplomatic protection in making host states comply
with promises given to foreign investors. First, the investor has no right vis-A-vis
its government to a grant of diplomatic protection, and the latter no duty to
accord it. Instead, states remain free to decline diplomatic protection.31 Second,
the home state exercises exclusive control over the rights of its nationals on the
international level and hence is entitled to settle, waive, or modify them by
agreement with the host state.32 In practice, this has led to the settlement of
international claims concerning the violation of the rights of foreigners by lump-
sum agreements.33 Third, under customary international law the entitlement to
receive compensation for the violation of international law protecting foreign
nationals is vested not in the alien but in his or her home state. Compensation
30 See, for example, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v Britain), 1924 PCIJ (ser B) no 3 at 12
(Aug 30,1924) ("By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights-its
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law."). On
diplomatic protection, see generally Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (Oxford
2008).
31 See, for example, Barcelona Traction, L'ght and Power Company, Ltd (Belgium v Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 44
(Feb 5, 1970), stating:
The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection
will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in
this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.
Similarly, most domestic legal systems do not oblige the state to pursue claims of its nationals by
means of diplomatic protection. See generally Annemarieke Vermeer-Ktinzli, Restricting Discretion:
Judicial Review of Diplomatic Protection, 75 Nordic J Intl L 279 (2006) (discussing national
jurisprudence and developments on the international level and observing an emerging
development towards a state's obligation to exercise diplomatic protection in case of serious
violations of human rights law).
32 Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 366-75 (Banks 1915). But see
Juiane Hagelberg, Die viilkerrechtliche V/efgungsbefugnis des Staates ilber Rechtsanspriche von
Priva 5ersonen 49-52 (Nomos 2006) (arguing, however, that human-rights law restricts the home
state's disposition over claims of its nationals, see id at 147-48).
33 Richard B. Lillich and Burns H. Weston, International Claims: Their Settlement by Lump-Sum
Agreements (Virginia 1975) (listing verbatim the text of 126 lump-sum agreements for settling
outstanding international claims without international adjudication and analyzing their central
features); Burns H. Weston, David J. Bederman, and Richard B. Lillich, International Claims: Their
Settlement by Lump-Sum Agreements, 1975-1995 (Transnad 1999).
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received therefore need not be paid to the investor by the home state espousing
the claim.34 Finally, diplomatic protection and interstate dispute settlement are
subject to the requirement that local remedies first be exhausted.3" While this
affords the host state an opportunity to redress a violation of a foreign investor's
rights, it also hardly affords efficient dispute settlement between investors and
host states if the host state's courts are not impartial and independent enough in
addressing that state's opportunistic behavior. The foregoing factors thus
illustrate the insufficiency of diplomatic protection as a procedural means for
efficiently enforcing host-state promises vis- -vis foreign investors and for
enabling host states to make fully credible commitments.
Likewise, contractual arrangements, which some suggest as an alternative to
investment-treaty arbitration," are inefficient and, above all, available only to
investors with sufficient negotiating power. Certainly, large-scale investment
contracts have always contained contractual arbitration clauses and have
included choice-of-law clauses, stabilization clauses that insulate an investor-
state contract from future changes of the law governing a contract," or
internationalization clauses that subject a contract to international law as the
governing law.38 By means of such contractual arrangements, investors and host
states are thus able to deal with some of the limitations of dispute settlement
under customary international law. Arbitration clauses remove the settlement of
disputes from the realm of domestic adjudication and alleviate connected
deficiencies; choice-of-law clauses, stabilization clauses, and internationalization
clauses, in turn, protect investor-state contracts against unilateral changes in the
governing law by the host state that might affect the contractual equilibrium.
By contrast, small- or medium-scale investors, who make up a large part of
the claimants in contemporary investment-treaty arbitration, are in a more
difficult position to negotiate for such protections. They may not have the
34 See Borchard, Diplomaiic Protection of CiiZens Abroad at 356-59, 383-88 (cited in note 32);
Hagelberg, Die vdlkerrechtliche Verfugungsbefugnis at 51 (cited in note 32). The home state, in turn, is
under no obligation to pass the compensation on to the investor who suffered the damage.
35 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 200-03 (Cambridge 2d ed 2004);
A.A. Cancado Trindade, The Applicaion of the Rule of Exhausion of Local Remedies in International Law
57-58 (Cambridge 1983) (explaining the rationale behind the rule of exhaustion, but arguing that
the purpose of the rule is still to give redress and that exceptions should exist where no adequate
redress is available locally).
36 Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in International Investment
Law, 3 Asian J WTO & Intl Health L 121, 128-36 (2008).
37 See generally Hanno Merkt, InvestitionsschutZ durch Stabilisierungsklauseln (1990). See also F.V.
Garcia-Amador, State Responsibilio in Case of "Stabilization" Clauses, 2 J Transnad L & Poly 23, 23-
24 (1993).
38 See Sornarajah, Pursuit of Nationalized Property at 279-82 (1986) (cited in note 29); Prosper Weil,
Problkmes relatifi aux contracts passis entre un Etat et unparculier, 128 Recueil des Cours 95 (1969-I1).
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necessary market strength and bargaining power to negotiate comparable
protection mechanisms and thus are placed at a structural disadvantage
compared to larger investors. Consequently, such investors are more likely to
refrain from making foreign investments at all because the risk associated with
the lack of enforceable commitments on behalf of the host state is too high.
Moreover, contractual solutions are unavailable to those investors who do
not enter into contractual agreements with the host state when engaging in
foreign investment projects, but instead make their investments based on the
country's general foreign-investment legislation. Such investors, who are not in
privity with the state or any of its agencies, are therefore excluded from
bargaining for contractual arrangements with protections and arbitration-
initiation rights comparable to those offered by investment treaties. In the end,
such contractual provisions, if not made subject to mandatory arbitration of
disputes, may be just as unavailing as any other promise that is not kept.
Certainly, the reverse situation of foreign investors behaving
opportunistically and attempting to renege on their original promises also exists.
However, the host state as a sovereign actor is typically able to react to such
conduct by unilaterally imposing sanctions on the investor and enforcing them
against the assets of the investment project.39 Consequently, the host state does
not depend on a dispute-settlement and compliance mechanism to make the
investor comply with its promises. Hence, the criticism that investment treaties
afford unilateral benefits to investors presents a very limited and in fact
contorted picture of investor-state relations.40 It disregards the fact that the host
state already possesses a power that the foreign investor lacks. In this
perspective, a direct right of action for foreign investors is but a modest
limitation on the host state's sovereignty and is essential to creating a basis for
effective and efficient foreign-investment activities. The fact that investor-state
arbitration makes host states comply with their substantive obligations should
thus not be considered as a mark against the legitimacy of international
investment law. Much to the contrary, it would be illegitimate to enter into treaty
3 Exceptionally, there are situations where this mechanism does not work effectively, such as when
an investor does not have any or sufficient assets within the host state's jurisdiction. But this is
not the usual situation in which foreign investors find themselves.
4 Furthermore, it may be noted that the procedural rules for investor-state arbitration, in particular
the ICSID Convention, do not exclude the possibility that host states may bring claims against
misbehaving investors. See, for example, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, art 36,
available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.
pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008). In addition, respondent states may bring counterclaims against foreign
investors in investment arbitrations. Hege Elisabeth Veenstra-Kjos, Counter-Claims by Host States in
Investment Dispute Arbitration 'Vithout Priviy,' in Philippe Kahn and Thomas W. WlJde, eds, Les
Aspects Nouveaux du Droit des Investissements Internationaux/New Aspects of International Investment Law
ch 13 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006).
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obligations and then deplore that sanctions in case of a breach can actually be
enforced.
111. INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND REGULATORY POWERS
The second major attack against the legitimacy of international investment
treaties is the often-heard reproach that investment treaties protect the investor
against every kind of risk, including business risks, or at the least require the host
state to compensate the investor for every regulatory change the host state
would like to introduce in order to further some legitimate public policy. This
reproach is, however, equally unpersuasive. First, investment treaties do not
protect investors against business risks or their own bad business judgment,4
but only against the political risks inherent in investing in a foreign country.42
Consequently, an investor has no claims against the host state for unfavorable
business conditions or a deterioration of the general business environment.
Instead, liability under investment treaties requires that the host state interfere
with the investor's investment. For instance, the existence of an economic crisis
as such will not entail any liability for the host state.43 Liability may attach,
however, if the host state, in reaction to this crisis, takes measures that directly
and adversely interfere with the investor's rights.' Claims that investment
41 See, for example, Marvin Feldman v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1,
Award of (Dec 16, 2002) 1 112-14, available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC587_En&caseld
=C175> (visited Dec 5, 2008); Emilio Agustin Maffe#ni v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,
Award of (Nov 13, 2000) 1 64, available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC566_En&caseld=C163>
(visited Dec 5, 2008); Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v The United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/2, Award of (Nov 1, 1999) 83, available online at
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVai=showDoc
&docld=DC544_En&caseld=C156> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
42 On the notion of political risk, see Noah D. Rubins and Stephan Kinsella, International Investment,
Political Risk and Dispute Resolution 1-25 (Oceana 2005).
43 See, for example, Sea-Land Service, Inc v Iran, Award No 135-33-1 (1984), reprinted in Vol 6 Iran-
US Cl Trib Rep 149, 164-65.
44 See, for example, Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16,
Award of (Sept 29, 2007) 325-91, available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC694_En&caseId=C8>
(visited Dec 5, 2008); Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No
ARB/01/3, Award of (May 22, 2007) 1 143-44; LG&E Energy Cop, LG&E Capital Carp,
LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability of
(Oct 3, 2006) 205, available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&acionVal=showDoc&docld=DC786_En&caseld=C208>
(visited Dec 5, 2008); CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01 /8,
Award of (May 12, 2005) 317, available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
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treaties secure foreign investors against business risks and make host states pay
for their realization are thus simply not accurate.
Similarly distorted is the complaint that investment treaties can lead to a
regulatory chill since they require host states to compensate foreign investors for
any adverse change in the host state's regulatory framework. Quite to the
contrary, while investment treaties establish rights only for foreign investors,
they do not abolish the host state's regulatory powers. Instead, as arbitral
jurisprudence illustrates, neither the standard of fair and equitable treatment nor
the concept of indirect expropriation establishes absolute rights for foreign
investors. Rather, they require that the host state, in taking measures that affect
foreign investors, give due consideration to the importance of the protection of
foreign investments by balancing the rights of foreign investors with conflicting
private and public interests.
Even though balancing or proportionality tests are not yet strongly
conceptualized, several investment-treaty arbitrations have already applied
them.45 Thus, arbitral tribunals have recognized that despite the lack of express
textual support in most investment treaties, states continue to dispose of their
core regulatory powers and are not required to compensate foreign investors for
the effects of bona fide, general regulations that further a legitimate purpose in a
nondiscriminatory and proportionate way. Under the concept of indirect
expropriation, for example, 46 it is firmly recognized that "regulations" do not
give rise to a right to compensation, even if they restrict the use a foreign
investor can make of its investment. In this context, the vast majority of arbitral
FrontServlet?requestType-CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docd=DC504_En&caseld=C4>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
45 See Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, Fair and Equitable Treatment,
Proporlionaliy, and the Emeging Administrative Law of Global Governance, presented at the International
Congress of Commercial Arbitration (June 9, 2008) (forthcoming 2009).
46 On the concept of indirect expropriation, see Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State:
Recent Developments in International Law, 176 Recueil des Cours 259, 322-47 (1982). For further
discussions of indirect expropriation, see generally Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory
Expropriation, 20 ICSID Rev Foreign Inv L J 1 (2005); L. Yves Fortier and Stephen L. Drymer,
Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19
ICSID Rev Foreign Inv L J 293 (2004); Jan Paulsson and Zachary Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in
Investment Treaty Arbitrations, in Norbert Horn and Stefan Kr6ll, eds, Arbitrating Foreign Investment
Disputes 145 (Kluwer 2004); Catherine Yannaca-Small, 'qndirect Expropriation" and the ' Right to
Regulate" in International Investment Law, OECD Working Paper on International Investment No
2004/4 (Sept 2004), available online at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf>
(visited Dec 5, 2008); Thomas W. Waelde and Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment
Protection and Regulatory Taking' in International Law, 50 Ind & Comp L Q 811 (2001); Rudolf
Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Rev Foreign Inv L J 41 (1986); Burns H.
Weston, 'Constructive Takings' under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of 'Creeping
Expropriation', 16 Va J Intl L 103 (1975); George C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Propery
under International Law?, 38 Brit YB Intl L 307 (1962).
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tribunals adopt the so-called "police power" doctrine in deciding whether a
general measure entitles an investor to compensation.
Thus, the Tribunal in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico held that
"It]he principle that the State's exercise of its sovereign powers within the
framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to
its powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation
whatsoever is undisputable. 47 Similarly, the Tribunal in Methanex Corp v United
States stressed that
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that
the government would refrain from such regulation.
48
In principle, therefore, the mere interference with a property interest is not
necessarily sufficient for a finding of expropriation. Especially general
regulations will only constitute expropriations to the extent they impose a
disproportionate burden. Conversely, host states will not have to compensate
for proportionate general regulation.
The concept of proportionality was further elaborated upon by the Tribunal
in Tecmed v Mexico. The Tribunal stressed that it had to
consider, in order to determine if [the interferences] are to be characterized as
expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public
47 Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed SA v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2,
Award of (May 29, 2003) 119, available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC602_En&caseld=C1 86>
(visited Dec 5, 2008). See also the jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which
emphasizes the "principle of international law that a State is not liable for economic injury which
is a consequence of bona fide 'regulation' within the accepted police powers of states." Sedco, Inc v
Iran, Award No ITL 55-129-3, reprinted in Vol 9 Iran-US Cl Trib Rprt 248, 275 (1985); Sea-Land,
6 Iran-US Cl Trib Rep at 165; Emanuel Too v Greater Modesto Insurance Association and United States,
Award No 460-880-2, reprinted in Vol 23 Iran-US Cl Trib Rep 378, 387 (1989), stating:
[A] State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that
is commonly accepted as within the police power of States, provided it is not
discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property
to the State or to sell it at a distress price.
48 Methanex Corporation v United States ofAmerica, NAFTA, Award of (Aug 3, 2005) part IV, ch D, 7,
available online at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf> (visited Dec 5,
2008). See also Saluka Investments BV v The CZech Republic, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award
of (Mar 17, 2006) %1 254-62, available online at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-
CZ%20Partial%2OAward%20170306.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); International Thunderbird Gaming
Corp v The United Mexican States, NAFIA, Award of (Jan 26, 2006) 1 127, available online at
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itnaward.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); LG&E, ICSID Case No
ARB/02/1 at TT 194-97; Manin Feldman, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/1 at 103-06.
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interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to
investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact has a key
role upon deciding the proportionality. 49
Proportionality reasoning therefore helps to achieve a balance between the
affected property right and the public interest that is to be protected. In deciding
whether such a balance existed in the case at hand, the Tribunal in Tecmed looked
at the legitimate expectations of the investor, the importance of the regulatory
interest pursued by the host state, and the weight and the effect of the
restriction. In addition, a general measure, in order to be proportionate, must
not specifically target or unequally affect one investor compared to other
investors and thereby violate equal protection. As a consequence, general
regulations can give rise to a right to compensation if they restrict property
disproportionately or lead to a "special burden" on some investors.50
With respect to the intensity of the impact of the measure on the property,
tribunals rather unanimously require the passing of a high threshold. A
diminution in the value of foreign-owned property alone is not sufficient. Thus,
the Tribunal in LG&E Energy Coro, LG&E Capital Coo, LG&E International Inc
v Argentina reiterated that an indirect expropriation does not occur "where the
investment continues to operate, even if profits are diminished. The impact must
be substantial in order that compensation may be claimed for the
expropriation."" It is necessary to show that the business activity was affected in
such a way that any business activity has "disappeared; [in other words,] the
economic value of the use, enjoyment[,] or disposition of the assets or rights
affected ... [has] been neutralized or destroyed."52
By contrast, Metalclad Coro v Mexico, which often is cited for exemplifying a
much more rigid application of the concept of indirect expropriation, is not
really apposite. While it has been interpreted as a particularly clear example of
the exorbitant scope of the protection of property under investment treaties,
endorsing what has been described as the "sole-effects" doctrine53 that
49 Tecmed, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2 at 122. For a closer look at the proportionality test used
in Teemed, see Stephan Schill, Revisiting a Landmark: Indirect Expropriation and Fair and Equitable
Treatment in the ICSID Case Tecmed, 3 Transnad Disp Mgmt 1, 8-13 (Nov 2006).
50 This idea is conveyed in an important strain of takings jurisprudence in Germany that relies on
whether property owners suffered a "special sacrifice" ("Sonderopfer') to the benefit of the general
public. See Waelde and Kolo, 50 Intl & Comp L Q at 845-46 (cited in note 46).
51 LG&E, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 at 191.
52 Tecmed, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2 at 116.
53 Rudolf Dolzer and Felix Bloch, Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?, 5 Intl L Forum du
Droit Intl 155, 158-163 (2003); Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?, 11 NYU
Envir LJ 64, 79-90 (2002).
Vol 9 No. 2
Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimagy of International Investment Law?
disregards the purpose a certain measure pursues,54 this case did not, in fact,
involve a regulatory taking at all. Rather, Metalc/ad concerned the frustration of
an assurance that the central Mexican government had given to the investor in
question that all permits to operate the envisioned waste landfill had been
granted and that construction could start.
In sum, the concept of indirect expropriation therefore leaves broad leeway
for host states to regulate foreign investment, provided that such regulation
serves a legitimate government purpose, is nondiscriminatory, and strikes a
easonable or proportional balance between the protection of the investor's
investment and any competing public interest.
The same holds true with regard to the concept of fair and equitable
treatment. Although this standard seems particularly vague and is used broadly
by tribunals as a yardstick for the host state's judicial, administrative, and
legislative actions, its application is not as unpredictable and capricious as some
critics argue. 51 In particular, it does not entitle arbitral tribunals to second-guess
government decision making or elevate the arbitrators' personal understandings
of what is fair and equitable to a benchmark for government decision making.
5 6
Instead, fair and equitable treatment can be understood as government
according to the rule of law that establishes basic substantive and procedural
rights concerning the stability and predictability of the legal framework;
consistency of the host state's decision making; the protection of investor
confidence or "legitimate expectations"; procedural due process and the
prohibition of denial-of-justice; protection against discrimination and
arbitrariness; and the requirement of transparency.
57
54 Metalclad Cotporation v The Mexican United States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of (Aug
30, 2000) 103.
55 On fair and equitable treatment, see generally Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment under
Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law, IILJ Working Paper 2006/6, available online
at <http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-6-GAL-Schil-web.pdf> (visited Dec 5,
2008); Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution?: Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment in
International Investment Law, 6 J World Inv & Trade 297 (2005); Christoph Schreuer, Fair and
Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J World Inv & Trade 357 (2005); Catharine Yannaca-Small,
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD Working Paper on
International Investment, No 2004/3, available online at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/
53/33776498.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Ky
Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 Intl Law 87 (2005).
56 See, for example, Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada, NAFTA, Award of (Apr 10, 2001) 155, available
online at <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/
AwardMerits-e.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); SD Myers, Inc v Canada, NAFTA, Award of (Nov 13,
2000) 261, 263, available online at <http://www.internaional.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/myersvcanadapartialaward-final1 3-11 -00.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
57 Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment at 11-23 (cited in note 55).
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However, like the concept of indirect expropriation, the standard of fair and
equitable treatment does not immunize investors from regulatory changes unless
host states have promised specifically to refrain from such changes. Fair and
equitable treatment does not require absolute stability, in the sense that the
parameters under which an investment operates could never be changed without
compensating the foreign investor. Instead, the standard of fair and equitable
treatment simply requires the state to give due consideration to the position of
investors and to the importance of the continuation of a specific regulatory
framework. Thus, the Tribunal in Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic stated
that a determination under the fair-and-equitable-treatment standard requires "a
weighing of the Claimant's legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one
hand and the Respondent's legitimate regulatory interests on the other."58
The Tribunal did not deem the protection of the investor's expectations as
absolute, but allowed the state to restrict them proportionately. Thus, the
Tribunal held that the host state had the power to "implemen[t] its policies bona
fide by conduct that is, as far as it affects the investors' investment, reasonably
justifiable by public policies and that such conduct does not manifestly violate
the requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness and non-
discrimination."" That the fair-and-equitable-treatment standard does not
suppress the host state's power to legislate in the public interest was also
stressed by the Tribunal in Parkerings-Compagniet v Ithuania, which stated:
It is each State's undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign
legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its
own discretion. Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a
stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the
amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an
investor made its investment. As a matter of fact, any businessman or investor
knows that laws will evolve over time. What is prohibited however is for a State
to act unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative
power.60
The approach of both awards is therefore similar to the proportionality test
that various tribunals have applied in the context of applying the concept of
indirect expropriation and that aims at balancing property interests and
competing public policy concerns.
The substantive rights granted in investment treaties therefore leave ample
room for host states to implement the policy goals they consider desirable,
58 Saluka, Award of (Mar 17, 2006) at 306.
59 Id at 307 (emphasis omitted).
60 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Ijthuania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, Award of (Sept 11,
2007) 332, available online at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC682_En&caseld=C252> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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including protection of the environment, human rights, labor standards, etc.
Investment treaties require, however, that the protection of investors be duly
taken into account. Equally, these treaties prevent governments from sacrificing
foreign investors for the public good by protecting them against expropriations
without compensation and measures that exceed what is reasonably acceptable
in a market economy. Although one can object to any such restrictions on
governments and disagree with the basic choice that investment treaties make in
favor of the protection of property and investment, one should not suggest that
investment treaties unilaterally favor investment protection over every
competing private and public interest. In particular, they do not go beyond the
guarantees of property that we know from various constitutional and
international law frameworks, and have not prevented governments from
implementing their noneconomic policy choices.
IV. IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATION
The final reproach advanced against the legitimacy of international
investment law concerns the selection of those who decide investment-treaty
disputes, in particular disputes that involve politically sensitive issues, such as the
scope of emergency powers or conflicts between business interests, on the one
hand, and human rights or the protection of the environment on the other.
Critics argue that arbitration, as compared to dispute resolution in courts, is
unsuitable for such public law disputes because arbitrators are privately
contracted by the parties to specific disputes and do not hold, like tenured
judges, a public office.6 For this reason, arbitration is said to institutionalize a
pro-investor bias because arbitrators are influenced by their self-interest in being
reappointed in future cases. This critique, however, disregards that arbitrators
are impartial and independent dispute resolvers who interpret and apply the
governing law and are subject to a number of mechanisms that can prevent
private interests from taking precedence over public interests.
First, it is already questionable whether, as critics argue, arbitrators really lack
a public office. Certainly, arbitrators are usually party appointed.62 The
appointment procedure, however, is contained in the rules of the respective
arbitration institutions that are referenced in an investment treaty. That is, the
basis of jurisdiction of tribunals in investment-treaty cases is not the type of
61 Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration at 152-53 (cited in note 14); Been and Beauvais, 78 NYU
L Rev at 45-46 (cited in note 14); Marc R. Poirier, The NAFFA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate
through the Eyes of a Propert Theorist, 33 Envir L 851, 914-27 (2003).
62 See, for example, ICSID Convention, Regulatiuons and Rules, art 37, available online at
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf> (visited Dec
5, 2008).
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party consent we find in commercial arbitration cases, where two parties agree
on arbitration as a dispute-settlement mode. Appointment can be governed by
the ICSID Convention, the UN Commission on International Trade Law
Arbitration Rules, the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, etc. The consent to arbitration by host states, in turn, is
contained in a treaty and not in a conventional instrument. It is treaty-mandated
arbitration without privity,63 comparable much more to a form of international
administrative review than to purely commercial arbitration, in which the parties
have full sovereignty over the proceeding.6 4 Furthermore, the consent to
arbitration in investment treaties is itself a sovereign act of the state.65
Consequently, the basis of the arbitrators' authority in investment-treaty cases is
founded in a public office which is conferred upon them based on international
treaties. This counters the argument that public disputes under investment
treaties are subjected to privatized dispute settlement.
The second argument-the lack of permanent appointments-is the more
serious criticism of investment-treaty arbitration. Arbitrators, the argument goes,
earn their living by the fees they earn from appointments. Consequently, since
they have an interest in being reappointed in future cases, they may be inclined
to cater to the interests of those who will appoint them in the future.66
Arbitrators thus are viewed as having a financial stake in the outcome of the
proceedings and therefore as not fully impartial and independent. Tenured
judges, by contrast, earn their living independently of the number of cases they
hear and of the results they reach. Only tenured appointments are thus viewed as
meeting the standards of impartiality and independence that are appropriate for
63 See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, Contract without Pivity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2
Chi J Intl L 183 (2001) (pointing out that consent to arbitration under investment treaties
constitutes a standing offer to initiate arbitration which can be accepted by covered investors by
initiating arbitration); Bernardo Cremades, Arbitration in Investment Treaties: Public Offer ofArbitration
in Investment-Protection Treaties, in Robert Briner, ed, Law of International Business and Dipute Settlement
in the 21st Century 149 (Heymanns 2001) (describing the host state's consent to arbitration under
an investment treaty as a public offer directed to investors covered under the treaty); Jan
Paulsson, Arbitration without Priviy, 10 ICSID Rev Foreign Inv L J 232 (1995).
64 See Van Harten, Investment Treay Arbitration at 58-68 (cited in note 14); Thomas W. Wilde, The
Spedfic Nature of Investment Arbitration, in Kahn and Wiide, eds, Les Aspects Nouveaux du Droit at 43,
112 (cited in note 40); Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a
Spedes of GlobalAdministrative Law, 17 EurJ Ind L 121, 145-50 (2006).
65 Van Harten himself considers the host state's consent to constitute a sovereign act. See Gus Van
Harten, The Public-Private Disinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims against the State,
56 Intl & Comp L Q 371,378-80 (2007).
66 Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration at 180-84 (cited in note 14).
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the kind of public-law disputes in investment-treaty arbitrations.67 Tenure of
judges is viewed as the only institutional mechanism that can ensure the decision
maker's impartiality and independence.
The difficulty with this critique, however, is that it takes a myopic view of
how impartiality and independence can be secured. It disregards the fact that
investment-treaty arbitration is imbued with several formal and informal
mechanisms that ensure the impartiality and independence of arbitrators. First,
arbitrators are under a duty to disclose relevant information that might cast
doubt on their ability to render an impartial and independent decision. Thus,
they must disclose existing and past relations with any of the parties, such as
earlier engagements as counsel or the existence of specific financial stakes in the
outcome of an arbitration proceeding (for example, ownership in an arbitrating
corporation). Such disclosure requirements filter out the most obvious stakes an
arbitrator can have in the outcome of an investment-treaty case and putatively
make him unable to decide such cases in an impartial and independent manner.
Furthermore, arbitrators are subject to challenges that either party can bring
against them. This allows an independent and disinterested third party-either a
domestic court, the appointing authority, or the arbitral institution itself-to
consider whether there are indicators that cast the arbitrators' impartiality and
independence into doubt.
Furthermore, there are significant informal control mechanisms that so far
have been overlooked in the current debate about the suitability of arbitration.
Certainly the parties, both investors and states, have an interest in appointing
arbitrators that they hope will support their respective positions. Significant
investors would be ill-advised, for example, to appoint as arbitrator a person
who is known to be critical of large businesses. Equally, a state would not
appoint somebody who has a minimalist view of the objectives of state activity
and is critical of any state intervention with private affairs and the market.
Notwithstanding these basic and obvious dynamics, it is important to stress
that arbitrator appointments in investment-treaty cases do not hinge primarily
on the arbitrator's position on the substantive issues in dispute in a specific case.
What is primarily important is the arbitrator's reputation for impartial and
independent judgment. After all, arbitrators in investment-treaty cases are not
advocates for the party that appointed them, and both parties and arbitrators
understand that. Instead, investment-treaty arbitration does not differ
substantially from dispute settlement by domestic courts with regard to the
decision making process itself. Arbitrators engage, like judges, in the finding of
the relevant facts and apply the governing law to those facts. Most importantly,
67 Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, SIEL Inaugural Conference Working
Paper, available online at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=153724> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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arbitrators in investment-treaty disputes are required to reach their decisions
based on their impartial and independent judgments. For this reason,
investment-treaty arbitration has little in common with private-law arbitration
where the parties have full sovereignty in determining not only which law
arbitrators have to apply, but also whether they should render an impartial and
independent decision at all. Instead, investment-treaty arbitration in its decision
making process is an adjudicatory process based on independent fact-finding
and legal analysis according to rules of law by neutral, independent, and impartial
decision makers.68 One can therefore very well conclude that international
arbitration, including investment-treaty arbitration, is in fact not classic
arbitration where the parties have full liberty to set the standards for the
decision-making process and can control the way the dispute is resolved.69
Appointments therefore are essentially merit-based. The crucial factor for
appointment is not the possible or real bias of an arbitrator in favor of a party's
position. It is rather his or her reputation for impartial and independent
judgment that earns appointments. Reputation is difficult to build up and is
easily destroyed; these characteristics thus work against any incentive to taint
one's decision making in favor of either party in order to secure future
appointments. A reputation for independence and impartiality, in other words, is
too fragile to risk by biased decisionmaking and therefore works as a control
mechanism that ensures the arbitrators' independence and impartiality.
Another important informal control mechanism is public scrutiny. Unlike
commercial arbitration awards, most investment-treaty awards are made
70
available to the public almost instantaneously via online resources.
Consequently, arbitrators and their decisionmaking are subject to scrutiny by
both the professional community of arbitrators and academics as well as the
general public. Today, investment-treaty awards are discussed and scrutinized in
law review articles, internet blogs, and online discussion fora.7 1 Arbitrators
68 See Susan D. Franck, International Arbitrators: Civil Servants? Sub Rosa Advocates? Men of Affairs?: The
Role ofInternalionalArbitrators, 12 ILSAJ Intl & Comp L 499, 503-04 (2006).
69 See generally Jan Paulsson, InternalionalArbitraion Is Not Arbitration, EC Brierley Memorial Lecture
(May 28, 2008), available online at <http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12224354891890/
internationalarbitration is not arbitration.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
70 The most common online resources in this area are the ICSID home page, available online at
<http://icsid.worldbank.org> (visited Dec 5, 2008); the Investment Treaty Arbitration home
page, available online at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca> (visited Dec 5, 2008); the Transnational Dispute
Management home page, available online at <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com> (visited Dec 5, 2008); the NAFTA Claims home page, available online at
<http://www.naftaclaims.com> (visited Dec 5, 2008); and Oxford UP's Investment Claims
home page, available online at <http://www.investmentclaims.com> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
71 OGEMID (oil, gas, energy, mining, infrastructure, and investment disputes) is the most
prominent example. On the changes the internet brings to the way academic discussion is
Vol. 9 No. 2
Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimay of International Investment Law?
therefore are constantly in the spotlight of those communities that have an
impact on their reappointment. This public observation exercises additional
pressure on arbitrators to render impartial and well-reasoned awards that live up
to the expectations of the parties and the general public. Arbitrators who do not
live up to such standards will be seen by the relevant community to have fallen
short in that regard, with consequent effects on their careers. Future
appointments as tribunal chairperson, president, or presiding arbitrator almost
certainly will be curtailed, if they do not disappear completely. If an arbitrator
becomes branded as distinctly "pro-state" or "pro-investor," party appointments
will be channeled accordingly. In the latter case that individual's reputation for
such apparent bias will undercut his or her influence within tribunals, which over
time inevitably will decrease that individual's market appeal. No discerning party
or counsel will want to appoint as arbitrator someone unlikely to enjoy sincere
respect for intellectual integrity within a tribunal. Thus reputational damage,
made quicker and easier by public scrutiny, is arguably an effective mechanism
ensuring the impartiality and independence of arbitrators and their objectivity in
applying international law.
The historical record further supports the legitimacy of arbitration as a
dispute-settlement mechanism for investment-treaty disputes. Far from being
perceived as casting the legitimacy of dispute resolution into doubt, arbitration
has served as an accepted system of dispute resolution in public international law
and has been tested and accepted by states over centuries. 2 Thus, modern
interstate arbitration grew into a sophisticated system much before private-law
arbitration did. Starting with the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the UK and the US,
public international law arbitration has flourished and grown into and beyond
the twentieth century. Thus, the establishment of an international institution-
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which could administer arbitrations
between states-was considered one of the great successes of the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1899 and 1907.] Interstate arbitration was also the precursor of
the international courts that later came into existence, in particular the
Permanent Court of International Justice that took up its work in 1922 and the
structured in international law and investment arbitration, see generally Jos6 E. Alvarez, The
Democratization of the Invisible College, available online at <http://www.asil.org/ilpost/
president/pres07ll08.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
72 See generally John Graham Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (Cambridge 4th ed 2005); John
Graham Merrills, The Contribution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to International Law and to the
Settlement of Disputes by Peaceful Means, in Phyllis Hamilton, ed, The Permanent Court of Arbitraion:
InternationalArbitraion and Dispute Resolution: Summaries of Awards, Settlement Agreements and Reports 3
(Kluwer centenary ed 1999). See also Lori F. Damrosch et al, International Law: Cases and Materials
836-38 (West 4th ed 2001).
73 See Shabtai Rosenne, ed, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration:
Reports and Documents 83-88 (TMC 2001).
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International Court of Justice ("ICJ") that followed in 1946. The strong support
of states to resolve disputes through arbitration thus underscores the fact that
states considered arbitration as one option for dispute resolution, and surely one
that was no less proper or legitimate than settling disputes in a permanent court.
In addition, the legitimacy of investment-dispute arbitration rests, to a large
extent, on the fact that the parties to the proceedings can participate in the
appointment of the arbitrators. This ensures that the decision-making process is
not perceived as something wholly extraneous to the parties, but instead as a
legitimate mode of resolving disputes. Participation in the appointment of those
who decide disputes is particularly important when states are involved in
international dispute settlement. Thus, even when submitting a dispute to the
ICJ, states that do not have one of their nationals as a titular judge of the court
are entitled to appoint a judge ad hoc in order to be represented among the
decision makers.74
Furthermore, the possibility of appointing decision makers in investment-
treaty arbitrations by no means favors the interests of investors over the
interests of states. Instead, it ensures that states have, by means of appointing an
arbitrator, a certain degree of control over the future direction of investment
arbitration. They can thereby react to jurisprudential developments of which
they disapprove by appointing individuals who support a line of thinking and
reasoning that is aligned with the understanding states have of the way
investment treaties should be applied and interpreted. The possibility of
influencing the appointment of arbitrators on an ad hoc basis is all the more
important for states as it is one of the few ways in which they can influence the
direction of investment jurisprudence after an investment treaty has been signed.
Certainly, all contracting parties can get together and formally change an
investment treaty or agree by other binding means on the interpretation to be
given to certain investor rights.75 Similarly, the contracting parties can establish
treaty organs, like NAFTA's Free Trade Commission, that are empowered to
issue such interpretations and thereby steer investment tribunals into directions
74 Statute of the International Court of Justice (une 26, 1945), art 31, 33 UN Treaty Ser 99.
75 See, for example, National Grid v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction of (June 20,
2006) 85, observing that
after the decision on jurisdiction in Siemens, the Argentine Republic and
Panama exchanged diplomatic notes with an "interpretative declaration" of the
MFN clause in their 1996 investment treaty to the effect that, the MFN clause
does not extend to dispute resolution clauses, and that this has always been
their intention.
Such understandings on the interpretation of investment treaties between the contracting states
are binding as subsequent understandings under Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. See, for example, Metbanex, NAFTA at part IV, ch C, 20-
22.
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that are in tune with the states parties' intentions.76 Yet such changes require the
consent of all contracting parties, which is often quite difficult to achieve
because, once an investment treaty is in force, the parties may have different
incentives and interests compared with the situation that existed when they
entered into the treaty.
Influencing investment jurisprudence by means of the appointment process
might, by contrast, be easier to achieve. Thus, a permanent court with tenured
judges that are not removable might result in the creation of an institution that
potentially restricts state sovereignty more significantly than arbitrators allegedly
do today. The establishment of a permanent court that is even less deferential to
state sovereignty than contemporary arbitration, therefore, may make the system
of investor-state dispute settlement even less acceptable to states and thus less
legitimate.77 In any case, the capacity of states to appoint arbitrators in
investment-treaty arbitration counters any potential pro-investor bias that the
investor-appointed arbitrator might evince. In the end, the resolution of the
dispute thus will be grounded in accepted modes of applying and interpreting
international law and in the application of this law to the facts as submitted by
the parties. It is no more and no less biased than the settlement of investment
disputes in an international court.
V. CONCLUSION
Overall, states seem to accept that international investment treaties and
investment-treaty arbitration are legitimate, even if they occasionally disagree
with some of the decisions arbitral tribunals reach on some of the finer points of
international investment law. They sometimes react negatively to such decisions
and adapt their future investment-treaty practices by introducing language that
restates the content of standard investors' rights. As an example, the US 2004
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty contains, in reaction to certain decisions of
arbitral tribunals, language that concretizes fair and equitable treatment or the
concept of indirect expropriation. 8 Such reactions by states should, however,
not be read as casting doubt on the legitimacy of the entire system of
investment-treaty protection and arbitration. They are rather part of a dynamic
76 See Gary H. Sampliner, Arbitration of Epropriation Cases Under US Investment Treaties: A Threat to
Democra-y or the Dog that Didn't Bark?, 18 ICSID Rev Foreign Inv L J 1, 30-32, 43 (2003); Patrick
G. Foy, Effectiveness of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven Investor-State Arbitration Procedures, 18 ICSID Rev
Foreign Inv LJ 44, 99-103, 108 (2003) (both arguing that such mechanisms are effective).
77 Compare Eric Posner and John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal L Rev 1
(2005), with Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals:
A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal L Rev 899 (2005).
78 See Gagn6 and Morin, 9 J Ind Econ L at 357 (2006) (cited in note 17); Kantor, 21 J Ind Arb at
383 (2004) (cited in note 17). See generally Schwebel, 3 Transnatl Disp Mgmt 1 (cited in n 17).
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that we can equally witness in the domestic realm in the interaction between the
judiciary and the legislature. There, just as in investment-treaty arbitration, the
legislature may "correct" developments in the jurisprudence that it did not
foresee or with which it does not agree.
The more drastic reactions of states, such as terminating investment treaties
or withdrawing from the ICSID Convention, by contrast, are a phenomenon
that seems to be limited to a minority of states and can often be explained more
by the countries' internal political situation rather than a more widespread view
of a lack of legitimacy of international investment law and arbitration. Above all,
the situation today differs considerably from the times of the New International
Economic Order in the 1970s when developing countries and the socialist bloc
attempted, through UN General Assembly resolutions, to do away with the
protection of alien property under international law and attacked the very basic
consensus on the desirability of the protection of property by international law
and the submission of states to international dispute settlement.79 Today, by
contrast, most states do not espouse such extreme views.8" Consequently, there
is no reason to view the isolated opposition of some states to international
investment law as an indicator of a more universal discontent or a firm basis
upon which to question the legitimacy of this field of international law.
What should, after all, not be forgotten in this debate is that both capital-
importing and capital-exporting countries derive benefits from increased flows
of foreign investment. Apart from the transfer of technology connected to
foreign investment, the creation of employment, additional tax revenue, etc.,
investment treaties create a legal infrastructure for the functioning of a global
market economy by protecting property rights, offering contract protection,
establishing nondiscrimination as a prerequisite for competition through national
and most-favored-nation treatment, and making effective dispute-settlement
mechanisms. 81 Perfect market conditions presupposed, this leads to the efficient
allocation of capital, economic growth, and development, and benefits both
79 See Rudolf Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschddigung im geltenden Volkerrecht 24 (Springer
1985). More generally on the politics and economics connected with the New International
Economic Order, see Jeffery A. Hart, The New International Economic Order (St. Martin's 1983);
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The New InternationalEconomic Order (MIT 1978).
80 See Thomas W. Wdlde, A Requiem for the 'New International Economic Order": The Rise and Fall of
Paradigms in International Economic Law and a Post-Mortem with Timeless Signfcance, in Gerhard Hafner
and Gerhard Loibl, eds, Liber Amicorum: Professor Ignat Seidl-Hohenveldern in Honour of His 80th
Birthday 771 (Kluwer 1998).
81 Stephan Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People's
Republic of China, 15 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 73, 116-18 (2007).
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capital-exporting and capital-importing countries through an increase in overall
well-being. 2
Certainly, investment-treaty disputes today touch on intricate questions that
can go to the heart of a state's public policymaking. Investment treaties can
affect the way host states govern, legislate, and adjudicate and can have a
profound impact on local populations. Disputes about the supply of public-
utility providers, for example, or disputes arising out of measures for the
protection of the environment, directly affect the host state's society. As a
consequence, those affected by the outcome of such disputes have an interest in
being informed about or even in participating in investment-treaty arbitrations.
This legitimate concern can and should, however, be accommodated in the
current system of international investment protection. Steps towards an
accommodation of such interests consist, for example, in the increased
transparency of investment-arbitration proceedings and investment-treaty
awards and the participation of third parties as amici curiae. 3 Such concerns,
however, do not require a fundamental redesign of the entire system of
international investment protection.
While aspects of the system should be critically observed and evaluated, the
system design as such faces fewer fundamental concerns than critical voices
purport. Instead, critics should look to the outcomes of arbitration proceedings
in order to evaluate the legitimacy of international investment protection and the
capacity of arbitrators to live up to the standards of independence, impartiality,
and judicial judgment. Arbitrators not only achieve efficient and effective dispute
settlement but they also, through their independent and impartial application of
the governing law, foster the international rule of law and an investment-friendly
environment. It is also true that investment jurisprudence leaves states the
necessary leeway to implement their policy choices and to legislate in a self-
82 On the connection between institutions and growth, see generally Daron Acemoglu, Simon
Johnson, and James Robinson, Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Ran Growth, in Philippe
Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds, Handbook of Economic Growth 385 (Elsevier 2005), pre-
publishing working paper available online at <http:/www.nber.org/papers/wl0481 > (visited Dec
5, 2008); Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primag of
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J Econ Growth 131 (2004).
83 On issues of transparency in investment treaty arbitration see generally Christina Knahr and
August Reinisch, Transparen versus Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration-The Biwater
Gauff Compromise, 6 L & Practice Intl Courts & Tribs 97 (2007); Jack J. Coe, Transparency in the
Resolution of Investor-State Disputes-A Stoy of Adoption, Adaptation, and Evolving Expectations, 54 Kan
L Rev 1339 (2006). See also Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Third-Party Participation (NGOs and Private
Persons) and Transparengy in ICSID Proceedings, in Rainer Hofmann and Christian J. Tams, eds, The
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)--Taking Stock After 40 Years
179, 180, 192 (Nomos 2007) (cautioning that investor-state arbitration, having origins in private
commercial arbitration, is highly confidential, and suggesting ways to build in greater transparency
to the procedures).
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determined and sovereign manner. If one prefers, by contrast, a world in which
property interests must yield to any other public interest, where the state's
contractual promises have no real value in the face of changed political
preferences and where good governance standards cannot be enforced, one can
do away with international investment treaties and investment-treaty arbitration.
This, however, would hardly lead to more legitimacy in international investment
relations, but rather to a chill in the global economy that is not in the interest of
host states or their populations. In general, investment treaties and investor-state
arbitration therefore constitute a legitimate mechanism for structuring and
stabilizing international investment relations without institutionalizing a pro-
investor bias or disregarding the host state's legitimate power to regulate in the
public interest.
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